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SOFTWARE DESIGN IMPROVEMENTS
PART I -- SOFTWARE BENEFITS AND LIMITATIONS
1. INTRODUCTION
Computer hardware and associated software have been used
for many years to process accounting information, to analyze
test data and to perform engineering analysis. Now comput-
ers and software also control everything from automobiles to
washing machines and the number and type of applications
are growing at an exponential rate. The size of individual
programs has shown similar growth. Furthermore, software
and hardware are used to monitor and/or control potentially
dangerous products and safety-critical systems. These uses
include everything from airplanes and braking systems to
medical devices and nuclear plants. The question is: how can
this hardware and software be made more reliable? Also,
how can software quality be improved? What methodology
needs to be provided on large and small software products to
improve the design and how can software be verified?
Fig1. SOFTWARE BENEFITS
-Reduction in weight.
-Better system optimization.
-Autonomous action can be taken by software in emer-
gencies.
-More features are given to users of computer based
products.
-System capabilities increased with computers
(communication bandwidth, tuning precision, etc.).
-Better design analysis of system.
-Better knowledge of causes of system problems.
1.1. Software Reliability
Fig2. SOFTWARE RELIABILITY
-Software reliability is defined as the probability that the
software (actually the computer and its software) will
not cause a failure of a system, or that softwarewill not
cause unanticipated conditions that could result in the
loss of a system or subsystems.
Software reliability includes the probability that the program
(again thinking in terms of the computer and its software)
being executed will not deliver erroneous output. People have
come to trust computer generated results (assuming they
think the input data is correct). However, now we begin to
encounter problems. Recently a manufacturer reported that
its motherboards using a particular IDE (Integrated Drive
Electronics) controller "when using certain operating systems
have the potential for data corruption that could manifest
itself as a misspelled word in a document, incorrect values or
account balances in accounting software .... or even
corruption of an entire partition or drive." The potential for
data errors due to software embedded on certain Pentium
computer chips has also been discovered.1
1.2. Why Is This Important?
Fig 3. SOFTWARE'S IMPORTANCE
-Tremendous growth in use of software.
-Growth in use of software to control critical systems
(life supports, safety systems, aircraft, nuclear power
plants, etc.
-Mechanical interlocks are being replaced with software
interlocks.
-Lack of discipline in generating software now exists.
-Many critical accidents have been associated with soft-
ware.
-Growth in use to continue.
There has been tremendous growth in use of software to
control systems. Software has been used to control critical
life-support systems as well as flight controls on military and
civilian aircraft. Mechanical interlocks which prevent unsafe
conditions from occurring (such as disabling power when an
instrument cover is removed) are being replaced with
software controlled interlocks. At times a lack of discipline
in generating software has existed.
Fig4. SOFTWARE'S IMPORTANCE (Continued)
DEMAND, RISK and NEEDS:
General Bernard Randolph:
...demand for software used to control military and
aerospace is growing at 25% per year....
...[software's] cost and schedule growth are due to "a
failure of systems engineering and the requirements
process."
Critical to weight savings in systems.
Critical to eliminating the need of personnel who could
be used betterelsewherel
This growth will continue. General Bernard Randolph said
demand for software used to control military and aerospace
is growing at 25% per year and that cost and schedule
growth are due to "a failure of systems engineering and the
requirements process. "2 The size of the software also
continues to grow. From a "few" lines of code twenty years
ago to 500,000 source-lines-of-code (SLOC) for 9J_ the
flight software of the Space Shuttle 3 and 1.588 million SLOC
for the F-22 Fighter. 4
This software is critical to weight savings in systems. The
use of a computer system to control aircraft and spacecraft
has tremendous weight and cost advantages over conventional
electro-mechanical systems and has led to its rapid use and
acceptance. Software use is also critical for eliminating per-
solmel who could be used better elsewhere.
The application of software in the automotive industry has
gone from an eight bit processor controlling engine applica-
tions to a power PC to add more and more built-in diagnos-
tics, suspension controls, etc.
However, some problems have become apparent. There are
many potential and unrecognized pitfalls to the application of
softwarethatareonlynow being realized. Because of the
complexity of software, it has been cited that only 1% of
major software projects are finished on time and budget and
25% are never finished at all. 5 Also, people treat software
controls as a black box and often have not attempted to
predict the reliability and safety implications of their soft-
ware.
Many serious incidents in safety-critical applications may
have been related to software and the complex control
interfaces that often accompany software controlled systems.
One example occurred when, "in 1983 a United Airlines
Boeing 767 went into a four-minute powerless glide after the
pilot was compelled to shut down both engines." This was
due to a computerized engine-control system (in an attempt to
optimize fuel efficiency) ordering the engines to run at a
speed where ice buildup and overheating occurred. 6
A China Airlines A300-600R Airbus crashed in part because
of cockpit confusion. "Essentially, the crew had to choose
between allowing the aircraft to be governed by its automatic
pilot or flying it manually. Instead, they flew a half-way
measure, most probably because they failed to realize that
their trimmable horizontal stabilizer (THS) had moved to a
maximum nose-up deflection as an automatic response to a
go-around command. It was defeating their effort to bring the
aircraft's nose down with elevator control .... ,,7
Because of these problems we need to ask the following
questions: What computer system errors can occur? What are
the risks to the system from software? Why do accidents in-
volving software happen--from both the systems engineering
and the software engineering viewpoint? What are some
software reliability or (safety) axioms that can be applied to
software development? How can we be aware of the real
risks and dangers from the application of software to a con-
trol and sensor problem? How can the design of software be
improved?
1.3. Software Quality
Part I and II of this tutorial, "Software Benefits And
Limitations" and "Software Quality And The Design And
Inspection Process," will answer a number of questions.
Fig5. SOFTWARE TOPICS
1. Introduction - Software Reliability
2. Overview - How Do Failures Arise?
3. Types of Software
4. Examples of Computer System Errors
5. Sources of Error
6. Tools to Improve Software System reliability & Safety
7. Software Development Tools
8. Software System Axioms and Suggestions.
9. Conclusions
10. References
What are some useful software quality metrics? What tools
exist to improve software quality? What should specifications
for software contain? How are the quality and reliability of
software assessed? What would you specify to improve
software safety? What are the tools that affect software
reliability and how do they affect software quality? What are
factors that affect tradeoffs and costing when software quality
is evaluated? How do you improve software quality?
Software quality should also be defined in terms of correct-
ness, interoperability, flexibility, efficiency, validity and
generality. This will also be discussed.
1.4. Software Safety
Because of the often catastrophic effects of software errors,
software development is now a key factor affecting system
safety. Therefore, a system can only be safe if its software
can not cause the hardware to create an unsafe condition.
Software safety is the effective integration of software de-
sign, development, testing, operation and maintenance into
the system development process. A safety-critical computer
software component (SCCSC) is a computer software
component (processes, modules, functions, values or com-
puter program states) whose errors can result in a potential
hazard, or loss of predictability or control of a system.
System functions are safety-critical when the software opera-
tions that, if not performed, performed out-of-sequence or
performed incorrectly could result in improper control func-
tions that could directly or indirectly cause or allow a haz-
ardous condition to exist. How can this software be im-
proved?
2. OVERVIEW: HOW DO FAILURES ARISE?
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t'
SOFTWARE
OPERATION
Fig. 6 -- Failure Origins
Generally, we can say that all failures come from the design
process, the manufacturing process or operation of the
equipment and in this case the computer, its associated soft-
ware and the system that it controls. Software is becoming a
critical source of failures--critical because failures often
come in previously unexpected ways. In the design of
mechanisms or structures, through a long history of the de-
sign process the type and severity of failures have become
well known. Hardware failures can often be predicted, in-
spections can be set up to look for potential failures and the
manufacturing process can be changed to make a mechanical
system more reliable.
In a mechanical system a small anomaly or error in the de-
sign or operation of a system often produces a predictable
and corresponding failure. Software is different. With soft-
ware, an incorrect bit, a corrupted line of code, or an error
in logic can result in disastrous consequences. Testing to
validate a mechanical system (though not perfect) can be set
up to validate "all" known events. On the other hand, soft-
ware with only a few thousand SLOC may contain hundreds
of decision options with millions of potential outcomes that
cannot all be tested for or even predicted. Also, historically
the design and behavior of mechanical systems have been
well known. Expanding the performance envelope of the de-
sign led to a new system that was similar to the old system.
The behavior of the new mechanical system was predictable.
This does not happen with software. With software, minor
changes in a program can lead to major changes in output.
2.1. Error Types
What are the types of errors that can occur with a computer
controlled system and where do they come from? There are
many sources of error (see Figure 7):
A hardware failure can occur in the computer itself, like
any other electrical device.
Hardware logic errors (in program logic controllers
(PLCs)) can be caused by mistakes in design or manufac-
ture.
Coding errors can occur in the program or the program can
become corrupted.
Requirements errors: missing, incomplete, ambiguous,
contradictory or incomplete specifications.
Logic errors in the program code can for a given set of in-
puts, cause the program to reach a state that was never
intended.
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Fig. 7-- Types of Errors
Corrupted data from partially failed sensors or internal
look up tables can have errors.
User interfaces problems can be extremely difficult to fred
(e.g., multiple points to turn off computer control of a
system, or keyboard buffers that are too small).
Faulty software tools (e.g., f'mite element structural analy-
sis code generation programs) with faulty logic and outputs.
The architecture of the computer can vary from platform to
platform and cause problems. Software verified on one
platform often behaves differently on another platform.
The interfaces between computers or computers and sensors
can be faulty or difficult to use.
2.2. Hardware/Software Failure Differences:
Fig8. HARDWARE & SOFTWARE FAILURE
DIFFERENCES
-Differences in methods of reliability prediction, inspec-
tion, testing between software and hardware compo-
nents.
-Due to nonphysical abstract nature of software which
are not based on cumulative damage.
- As a discipline, software reliability uses few of the tools
and methods that apply to hardware reliability.
There are vast differences between the methods used for
prediction, inspection, testing and verification of reliability in
software versus methods for system hardware components.
This is due to the nonphysical, abstract nature of software,
the failures of which are almost always information design
oversights or programming mistakes and are not caused by
environmental stresses or cumulative damage. Furthermore
the design rules for mechanical systems are usually well
known. A vast amount of historical data on similar systems is
available. Mathematical models of wear, fatigue, electrical
stress, etc are available to make life predictions. Each
software system is often unique_ Even with some code reuse,
complexity makes reapplication difficult. Some features of
software reliability compared to hardware reliability are
given in Table 2.2.
3. TYPES OF SOFTWARE
3.1. Based On Timing & Control
Fig9. TYPES of SOFTWARE Based On Timing/Control
-What is the allowability of real-time human assessment
of the system.
-What is the allowability of real time human interference
with the system.
-Is the software autonomous or informational.
-Is the software time-critical or non time-critical.
-Is the information provided general or of a critical na-
ture?
Software risks and impact on systems and data can be evalu-
ated based on what and how the software interacts with a
system, how humans interact with the system and the soft-
ware and whether or not this activity is carried on in real
time. Questions to be asked are: (1) Does the software con-
trol a system or does it just provide information? (2) Is real-
time human evaluation of output and interference allowed?
(3) Is the software output time-critical or non time-critical?
Table 2.2 - Hardware and Software Failure Differences
Category Hardware Software
Reliability Many mathematical models exist for predicting wear, Reliability predictions are nearly impossible due to the
Prediction Tools fatigue life and electronic component life. non-random distribution of errors.
Causes of Failures Wear-out, misuse, inadequate design, manufacture or Poor design affects software (The computer system on
maintenance or incorrect use can contribute to which the software resides can also fail).
failures.
Redundancy Hardware reliability is usually improved with Software reliability (except possibly for multiple voting
redundancy, systems) is not improved with redundancy.
Hard or Soft Soft failures (some degradation in service before Usually no soft failures occur (However, there may be
Failures complete failure) often occur due to wear, chemical some recovery routines that can take the system to a safe
action, electrical degradation, etc. state, etc.)
Maintenance Usually testing and maintenance improve hardware
and increase reliability.
Software reprogramming may introduce new and
unpredictable failure modes into the system. Reliability
may be decreased. Any change to the code should require
retesting ofthe software, but this is usually not
done.
Reliability Design theory, a history of previous systems and Software reliability is a function of the development
Prediction load predictions all allow excellent reliability process
Methodology predication.
(4) Is the data supplied by informational software critical or
non-critical? These issues are summarized in Table 3.1. Also
reference MIL-STD-882C, System Safety Program
Requirements, where types of software are based on levels of
control and hazard criticality.
3.2. Based on Run Methodology or Environment.
Fig.10. TYPES OF SOFTWARE Based On Environment
and Type of System Controlled
BASED ON ENVIRONMENT:
-Interactive
-Batch.
-Remote Job Entry.
BASED ON TYPE OS SYSTEM CONTROLLED:
-Embedded Software
-Applications Software
- Support Software
Another classification methodology of software is based on
how it is run:
Interactive implies a program that is continuously running
and interacting with the operator.
Batch implies a single run or process of a program (often
acting on data--such as a finite element analysis) where a
single output will occur.
Remote job entry implies a software environment where
programs are submitted or started by others, (at remote lo-
cations) again usually for a single output.
Finally, software may be classified according to the envi-
ronment in which the software operates. For example:
Embedded software is computer code written to control a
product; it usually resides on a processor that is part of the
product. Typical applications of embedded software in-
clude boiler controllers, washing machine computer con-
trols, automobile computer control, etc.
Applications software includes programs to analyze data. It
often runs as a batch job on a computer with limited input
from the user once the job is submitted. Typical applica-
tions include payroll systems, finite analysis programs,
material requirements planning (MRP) systems (updating
sections).
Support software tools may be thought of as another class
of programs. They are used to develop, test and qualify
other software products or to aid in engineering design and
development. Examples are compilers, assemblers, Com-
puter Aided Software Engineering Tools (CASE), etc.
4. EXAMPLES OF COMPUTER SYSTEM ERRORS
What are some examples of the problems that have been ob-
served with the application of software to control processes
and systems?
Fig. 11. EXAMPLES of COMPUTER SYSTEM ERRORS
RADIATION MONITOR
-Timing problem with data entry
-Hardware interlocks removed.
CHEMICAL PLANT
-Programmers did not understand process.
SPACE SHUTTLE
-Software revisions were not rechecked.
AIRLINER
-Personal compute shuts down navigationsystem
Here are some additional examples:
SPACE PROBE: Clementine 1, which successfuUy
mapped all of the Moon's surface was to have a close
encounter with a near-Earth asteroid. A hardware or
software malfunction on the spacecraft "resulted in a
sequencing mode that triggered an opening of valves for
Table 3.1 - Classification of Software Based on Level of Hazard and Control
Software
Control
Autonomous con-
trol exercised over
hazardous systems.
Semi-autonomous
control exercised
over hazardous
systems.
M/x of computer
and human control
over hazardous
systems.
No, but generates
information requir-
ing immediate
human action.
No, but human
action based on
information.
No, but human
action based on
information.
Information
Some information may be
available but insufficient for
real-time interference.
Real time information is
available to allow human/other
system interaction and control.
Real time information is
available to allow human
interaction and control. Human
control of some functions.
Complete real time information
presented to allow human
control over hazardous
systems.
Information presented non-real
time. Software does provide
critical information.
Information presented non-real
time. Software does not
provide critical information.
Human/Other Control Real
Interference Time
May be possible but not
desirable. Often no other
independent safety systems.
Possible and desirable under
some circumstances. Other
independent safety systems
or ability to disengage.
Yes, required for some sub-
systems of operation. Other
independent safety systems.
Human interaction required
to properly control the
system. Other independent
safety systems.
Human actions and decisions
are directly influenced by
information. Other checks.
Human actions and decisions
are directly influenced by
the information.
Examples
Yes Space shuttle main engine and solid
rocket booster ignition sequence.
Yes Aircraft terrain following system,
medication dispensing device, nuclear
power plant safety systems, automatic
go-around mode in aircraft (override).
Yes Aircraft fly-by-wire system of unstable
aircraft (example B-2) where computer
translates pilots control requests into
feasible flight surface modifications.
"Yes" Aircraft collision avoidance systems,
nuclear power plant instrumentation,
hospital patient vital signs.
No Statistical process control information
of machine tools, historical medical
information summaries.
No Financial and economic data.
four of the spacecraft's 12 attitude control thrusters,
allowing all of the hydrazine propellant to be used up."8
CHEMICAL PLANT: Programmers did not fully under-
stand the way a chemical plant operated. The specifications
stated that if an alarm occurred, all process control settings
were to be frozen. The resulting computer system released
a catalyst into a reactor and began to increase cooling water
flow to the reactor. While the flow was increasing the
system received an oil sump, oil low alarm and froze the
flow of cooling water at too slow a rate. The result was
that "the reactor overheated and the pressure release valve
vented a quantity of noxious fumes into the atmosphere."9
SPACE SHUTTLE: An aborted mission nearly occurred
during the first flight of Endeavor to rendezvous and repair
an Intelsat satellite. The software routine used to calculate
rendezvous firings "failed to converge to a solution due to a
mismatch between the precision of the state-vector tables,
which describes the position and velocity of the Shuttle."10
AIRLINER: A laptop computer used by a passenger on a
Boeing 747-400 flying over the Pacific caused the airliner's
navigation system to behave erratically. When the computer
was brought to the flight deck and turned on "the naviga-
tion displays went crazy."11
5. SOURCES OF ERRORS
Where do software errors come from. Rather than just
concentrating on concern for errors in the software logic, the
investigation as to sources of problems needs to be expanded.
Anytime an analog and/or electro-mechanical control system
is replaced with a computer system besides many unique
problems can occur.
5.1. Organizational Problems.
How do errors occur, what causes them and how can they be
eliminated? What are some of the procedures, organizational
arrangements and methodology that cause problems with
software?
• Communication Silver Bullets
• Documentation Personnel
• Standardization Software Reuse
• Configuration Management
ENGINEER
PROGRAMMER
Fig. 12 - Sources of Errors: Organizational Problems
(1) Communication:
Often there is a lack of communications and understanding
between the software programmer and the system or design
engineer. The designer does not understand the software and
the programmer does not truly understand the system with all
its potential failure modes (they do not have domain specific
knowledge). Programmers frequently fail to understand the
potential for problems if certain things are not done in a logi-
cal sequence. For example, "start heater and add fluids to
boiler" may be "logical" programming sequences, but what if
the computer has a fault after the heater is started, before
enough fluid is added to the boiler?
Design or safety engineers frequently do not understand
software and how it will control the system and the potential
for software problems. Often the computer and its software
are treated as a black box with no regard for the conse-
quences if the unit fails. In the past system safety engineers
have ignored software or looked at it superficially in analyz-
ing systems.
(2) Documentation:
There is a lack of software documentation standards, testing
and verification procedures. Practices such as not document-
ing the software analysis, inspection and test process or last
minute fixes without retesting and revefificafion cause many
problems. Lack of design and verification tools may exist.
Formal procedures for software inspection may be lacking or
the procedures may be in place but essentially ignored by the
software development group.
A potential flight problem was noticed on one experiment
scheduled to fly in space to evaluate the effects of micro-
gravity. To correct it the software was changed during a pre-
flight checkout on a holiday. The change was not verified.
During the mission, the heaters on a device would develop
only 25 % of the needed power. The simple software change
caused a the loss of some science data.
(3) Standardization:
There is a lack of software st_cmre standardization in many
organizations. Not requiring adherence to software standards
is an underlying contributor to many system failures. Trying
to be elegant in writing software, using complex techniques
and neglecting internal comments and written documentation
can seriously affect the quality of software. Lack of structure
standardization also lessens reuse of software as well.
(4) Personnel:
There is little attempt to keep good programming talent. A
turnover results in a loss of corporate knowledge. Changes in
personnel reduces reuse of code and causes problems when
maintaining software as well.
(5) Silver Bullets:
Over reliance on silver bullets to solve all a company's soft-
ware problems causes real issues to be overlooked. One of
the most difficult problems to deal with is unrealistic hope
that some advance in software development technology, some
new code generating tool or object oriented super code will
make software generation problems go away. This also mani-
fests itself when these state of the art techniques are exclu-
sively relied upon instead of using good documentation, for-
real requirements and continual interface between software,
design and safety personnel.
(6) Configuration Management:
There is often a lack of control over software changes both
during development and during maintenance of software.
Unauthorized changes in software or undocumented changes
in software put in by a programmer to fix a possible mistake
may cause many problems downstream. Toward the end of a
project pressure to just get the job done encourages code
changes without proper review or documentation.
(7) Software Reuse:
There is little attempt to reuse software. Many software pro-
grams are started from scratch (again with little control over
how the code is to be written). Note that attempts to reuse
code are often disastrous because of unknown defects.
5.2. Design and Requirements Problems
Besides organizational problems, poor analysis and flowdown
of requirements' specifications for an individual project can
cause errors, delays and cost overruns.
Fig. 13. SOURCES of ERROR: Design & Requirements
-Requirements
-Adding features
-Anticipating problems
-Software/Hardware interaction
-Isolating processes
These problems include:
(1) Requirements:
Poorly defined requirements for a specific software project
can cause a cost overrun and increase the probability that
code logic errors will be introduced. When real-time systems
are developed for new applications or applications outside the
normal areas of expertise of the software engineers, the need
for additional requirements to implement the basic system are
often needed. They are frequently discovered while the soft-
ware development process is well underway. Requirements
are often inconsistent, incomplete, incomprehensible, con-
tradictory and ambiguous as well.
(2) Additional Features:
Adding new features to the software is also major problem.
There is a perception that requirements for new features can
continue to be added long after programming has started with
little negative effect. But adding to performance requirements
has bad effects on system software. This addition of many
new requirements as the project progresses may be viewed as
a trivial problem by the design engineer but the software
must be changed for each new requirement. This adds to the
risk of increasing errors in the function or logic. The ques-
tion needs to be asked: Have the requirements been analyzed
as a complete set?
(3) Anticipating Problems:
There is often little attention given to protecting the software
controlled system from off-nominal environments. All the
emphasis is put into fulfilling performance requirements
without a careful analysis of what can go wrong with the
system.Littleattentionispaidtowhatstatesthesystemcan
reachthroughanunanticipatedseriesofevents.
(4)Software/HardwareInt raction:
There is often a lack of understanding of how the program
will actually run once a system is operational. There may be
problems with processing all the sensor data during a clock
cycle. The software may be unable to deal with changes in
physical conditions and processors.
(5) Isolating Processes:
Putting too many unnecessary software processes on a com-
puter controlling a safety-critical system can reduce assur-
ance that _ processes will be handled properly (safety-
critical refers to systems whose failures can cause loss of
life, loss of mission or loss of system).
5.3. Other Problem Areas
Problems with the software code are not our only concern.
The associated hardware, sensors and interfaces can also
pose special risks. Incorrect data, the reliability of the system
itself and the production, distribution and maintenance of
software are also problems.
Fig.14. SOURCES OF ERROR: Other Areas
-Reliability
-System/Sensor Interfaces
-Radio Frequency (RF) Noise
-Maintenance and manufacturing problems.
(1) Reliability:
The reliability and survivability of the computer hardware,
sensors, and power supplies are often not adequately planned
for. The Central Processing Unit (CPU), memory or disk
drives of a computer can fail. The system can lose power.
Excess heat or voltage spikes can also cause unanticipated er-
rors in performance, output or complete system shutdown.
(2) System/Sensors Interfaces:
The interfaces between sensors and other mechanical devices
can fail. Cables can become damaged and power supplies to
sensors or servo-controllers can fail. Often the anticipation of
these events and effective solutions are not handled ade-
quately.
(3) RF Noise:
The effect of radio frequency (RF) noise on computers, on
signals from sensors, and on components with damaged or
incorrect grounding and shielding is often not anticipated.
RF noise can affect the operation of a computer processor,
its memory and input/output devices as well. RF noise can
also affect sensors, poorly shielded cables, connectors and
interface boards (e.g., fiber optic to digital conversion, etc.).
This can cause errors or erroneous readings.
(4) Manufacture and Maintenance:
Proper manufacture, reproduction and distribution of soft-
ware are not always handled properly. This results in compi-
lation errors and improper revisions of code being distrib-
uted. Integration problems can occur during the assembly of
code, linking program modules together and transferring
files. Poor control over maintenance upgrades of software
and fkrmware also causes problems. Errors can result from
improper loading of programs, wrong batch files and patch-
ing to the wrong revision of software, etc.
Another classification of errors comes from a Rome
Laboratories study and is shown along with their percentages
of occurrence in Table 5.3. The study also shows the impor-
tance of interface design and documentation. 12
Fig. 15 -- Sources of Errors by Percentage
Source of Error Percent
Logic 21.29
Input/Output 14.74
Data Handling 14.49
Computational 8.34
Preset database 7.83
Documentation 6.25
User Interface 7.70
Routine to Routine Interface 5.62
6. TOOLS TO IMPROVE SOFTWARE SYSTEM
RELIABILITY & SAFETY
For each of the aforementioned problem causing agents,
there is a way to minimize risk and even eliminate to prob-
lem.
PROGRAMMER ENGINEER
Fig. 16 -- Tools to Improve Software System Reliability &
Safety
They are as follows:
6.1 Organizational Improvement
Various tools and techniques (some of which have been
briefly mentioned) when properly applied and supported at
all levels of the organization can do much to improve reli-
ability and safety of software.
(1)Communication:
Improve communication between designers, software engi-
neers and safety engineers through concurrent engineering
and safety review teams and joint training. Concurrent engi-
neering with regular meetings between design and software
engineering to review specifications and requirements will do
much to improve communications. Continuous discussions
with the end users will also improve understanding of the
background of the various system performance requirements.
Joint training and cross training will encourage developing
informal relationships and informal communication. Software
safety review committees made up of design, software and
safety personnel who continually meet to review specifica-
tions and implementation of software will help to assure that
safety-critical software performs properly. Also, specifica-
tions have to be carefully written, not just in "legal" terms
but clearly describing how the system should work. This will
convey the maximum amount of information.
(2) Documentation:
Improve software documentation standards, testing and veri-
fication procedures. Encourage the application of standands
for all software projects. This includes general requirements
for all system development projects, which industry or mili-
tary standards will be followed and what specific documents
are to be generated for any specific product. These docu-
ments may include a software management plan, a software
assurance plan, a software configuration management plan,
software requirements' specifications, a software test plan
and a software version description document (see Section II
for more details).
(3) Standardization:
Set and enforce software structure standards. The software
must be structured with good specifications as to what is and
what is not allowed. The programmer should not design
some "clever" program that cannot be readily understood or
debugged. Enforce safe subsets of programming language,
coding standards and style guides.
(4) Personnel:
Provide incentives to keep good programming talent and
maintain the corporate knowledge base. There should be a
mix of programming skills & experience. The ability to
transmit practical programming knowledge to new program-
mers who only have classroom training with little or no in-
sight into real world problems is very important. Keeping
senior programmers or senior managers who can review
software and participate in Independent Verification and
Validation (IV&V) of software across missions or products is
also of real benefit. Efforts should also be made to retain
workers who know the software systems to support software
maintenance and new applications of the code. Also, provide
training in proper methodologies.
(5) Silver Bullets:
If the introduction of major changes in the procedures for
generating software is contemplated, they must be review
with great care. Their impact on the software personnel,
maintenance of software and software standardization must
be evaluated carefully. Projects already underway and pro-
jects scheduled to be started may or may not benefit from the
change. Major disruptions to personnel can result. As with
any major change in the way a product is designed and de-
veloped, careful and complete training of personnel, a free
flow of information on the new system, assurances as to sup-
port of existing programmers and gradual introduction of the
new methods (e.g., starting on one small project, etc.) is re-
quired.
(6) Configuration Management:
Implement consistent controls over software changes and the
change approval process. This can be accomplished with a
variety of software development products including software
configuration management and code generation tools.
Computer Aided Software Engineering (CASE) tools and
other configuration management techniques can automatically
compare software revisions with previous copies and can
limit unapproved changes to software. Other programming
tools provide mission simulation and module interface docu-
mentation.
Software should also be modularized to facilitate changes and
maintenance. The software modules should have low cou-
pling (the number of links between modules shall be mini-
mized) and the software modules should have high-cohesion
(the level of self-containment).
Use a "clean room approach" to develop software. This
implies a highly structured programming environment and
tight control of the specifications for the software and sys-
tem. It also implies support and adherence to the software
analysis specifications.
(7) Software Reuse:
Encourage reuse of software with strict controls over soft-
ware structure and procedures for code reuse. Software
modules/software reuse also improves reliability. Reused
code benefits from faults removed in prior usage.
Modularized software with well documented and verifiable
inputs and outputs also enhances maintainability. Lewis
Research Center's (LeRC's) launch vehicle programs are
reused for each mission with only minor modifications. This
has achieved excellent reliability results.
6.2. Design and Requirements Improvements
The hardware and the software must be integrated to work
together. This integration includes the entire system with in-
put sensors and signal conditioners, analog to digital (A/D)
boards, the computer hardware/software itself and the output
devices (control actuators, etc.). Basic design methodology
can improvesoftwareas well. Somebasicapproaches
supportingthisconceptareasfollows:
(1)Requirements:
Spend sufficient time defining and understanding require-
ments. The system, software and safety engineers should
spend an adequate amount of time working with the end user
to both develop requirements, be able to express the re-
quirements in mutually understandable language and to have
requirements that are testable and verifiable.
(2) Additional Features:
Limit changes in requirements once the software design proc-
ess starts. The question needs to be asked: Is this additional
really a necessary requirement? Instead, functionality should
be reduced if necessary to achieve safety and basic perform-
ance goals. A huge number of ancillary, non-critical devices
and special graphical user interfaces may not be necessary
and only complicate and slow the system.
Put software in its proper place of importance. Many people
over confidently think, if a computer with its software is
controlling a system, it can never fail. They will believe
computer controlled readouts instead of their own senses.
This has given people a false sense of security.
(3) Anticipating Problems:
Fully analyze all the ways the software controlled system can
fail. What undesirable states can the system reach? Once this
is done procedures and methods can be implemented to make
sure these undesirable states and failure modes cannot be
reached. Make sure that they are not attainable through some
unusual (though not impossible) combinations of software
states, environment and/or input data. Then the system will
not be vulnerable to these failures.
While software does not degrade, it is virtually impossible to
prove the correctness of large, complex, real-time systems
(however, selective use of logic engines can be effective in
reducing uncertainty about a systems performance). Error
detection, correction and recovery software development are
also necessary to achieve fault tolerance. Examples of
common errors include inconsistent data in databases,
process deadlock, starvation and premature termination, run-
time failures due to out-of-range values, attempts to divide by
zero and lack of storage for dynamically allocated objects.
Software should detect and properly handle run time errors.
Software controls should assume the worst and prepare for it.
What undesirable states can the computer get to and how can
each of these states be prevented. A careful analysis of re-
sponses to failed or suspect sensors should also be made.
Software capable of real-time diagnosis of its own hardware
and sensors is very useful. Memory can be protected with
parity, error correcting code and read-only circuitry in mem-
ory. Messages received should be checked for accuracy, and
routes can be automatically changed when errors are de-
tected. Predefmed system exceptions and user defined fault
exceptions should be designed into application software.
Predefined exceptions can be raised by run-time systems.
The software should also have built-in or operating system
recovery procedures. Information for recovery includes
processor id, process name, data reference, memory loca-
tion, error type and time of detection.
(4) Software/Hardware Interfaces:
Computer timing problems and buffer overload problems
must be eliminated. If all alarms and sensors cannot be read
in one clock cycle of the Central Processing Unit (CPU)
errors may occur or alarms may be missed. Overloaded
buffers can result in CPU "lock-up."
Load balancing should be a part of operating system software
routines because failures are often caused by overloading one
or more processors in the system. This can be caused by an
increase in message traffic or the inability of a processor to
perform within time constraints, etc. Dynamic traffic time
sharing where message streams are distributed among identi-
cal processors with a traffic coordinator keeping track of the
relative load among processors is another potential tool to
support complex systems.
(5) Isolating Processes:
Systems for safety critical applications need to be separate
from everything else. System specifications often require
gathering data from hundreds of sensors, and performing all
sorts of non-critical tasks. Segregating these non-critical
tasks to a separate computer system will often improve as-
surances that safety critical functions will be not be disrupted
by defects in non-critical resources. Safety-critical modules
should be "firewalled."
For critical systems use proven hardware and technology.
Older computer systems and software that are "flight-proven"
and do the job should be chosen over newer computers
whose standards are rapidly evolving where critical applica-
tions are involved.
Analog interlocks on safety critical systems should be re-
placed with software interlocks only with the greatest of care.
A thorough, well-documented analysis of what would happen
with a computer failure and the system failure that the inter-
lock protects should also be made. An example of the prob-
lem of replacing mechanical interlocks with software inter-
locks involves a radiation therapy machine. An early model
of the therapy machine had a hardware interlock to prevent
radiation overdoses. The interlock was removed on a later
model and replaced with software logic. Several people were
killed when the machine overdosed them with radiation. The
problem was caused by the operator interface, poorly
documented data input procedures and inadequate safety pro-
cedures. The earlier model never experienced the problem
since the program did not control the interlock.13
In many cases, safety critical systems can have an analog
process (or a stand-alone computer) capable of taking over if
the primary computer fails. If a computer control fails on a
processplant,ananalogbackupsystem(whichwaspresum-
ablybeingcontrolledbythecomputer) could keep the proc-
ess running (though at less than optimum conditions). Alter-
natively, control actuators could go to a safe position if a
failure occurred. Usually, the process must be allowed to
proceed to some nominal conditions (e.g., partial cooling
water, partial product inflow into a process, etc.) before
shutting down.
Monitor the health of the backup systems and the ou_ut of
software control commands independently of the main control
computer. Have a separate computer performing health
checks on the main computer and on safety critical sensor
outputs.
Special tests should be done to verify the performance of
safety critical software. This includes testing to verify that
the software responds correctly and safely to single and mul-
tiple failures or alarms. The software should properly handle
operator input or sensor errors (e.g., data from a failed sen-
sor). Tests should be made to assure that the software does
not perform any unintended routines. Detection and action
upon failures with respect to entry into and execution of
safety-critical software components and the ability to receive
alarms or other inhibit commands should also be provided.
Formal methods can use abstract models and specification
languages to develop correct requirements. Logic engines
can be used to prove correctness of the requirements.
Lewis Research Center's (LeRC's) launch vehicle program
has for many years verified the software for each mission by
running the complete program in the mission simulation lab.
All of the mission constants and components are checked and
verified. LeRC has never lost a vehicle due to software
problems.
6.3 Other Improvements
The hardware/software system must also be integrated with
input sensors and signal conditioners (analog to digital
boards, etc.) and the output devices (e.g., servo-controlled
actuators). Reliability of all this hardware is also an issue.
Some basic approaches to total system performance are as
follows:
(1)Reliability:
The reliability and survivability of the electronic components
associated with the software control system can be improved
with proper protection of components from vibration, excess
heat and voltage and current spikes. Properly maintained
grounding and shielding also must be assured with mainte-
nance training and documentation. Having robust sensors,
actuators and interfaces will also contribute to a more reli-
able system. Sensor failure can cause wrong data to be proc-
essed. Even the fraying of cables has been linked with pos-
sible uncontrolled changes in aircraft flight surface actuation.
The reliability of computer controlled output devices (servo-
actuators, valves, relays, etc.) must be verified as well. The
output devices may also subject to noise problems. Error
recovery and restart procedures should be included in soft-
ware and properly tested.
Passive controls should be designed so that failures cause the
system to go to a safe state. If input commands or sensor
readings are suspect, the system should go to a safe condi-
tion. The latter should be done (as previously noted) with an
analog backup or an autonomous software module. The
autonomous software module should be in a separate backup
system.
Multiple Voting Systems (multiple computers running the
same task in parallel with independently written programs)
might help improve reliability. 14 Multiple computers with
software written for the same functional output but developed
independently is one way to handle the critical problem of
software getting to some condition that was never intended.
Systems should sense the occurrence of anomalies and alert
the operator. Health monitoring of the controlled system as
well as the computer itself, frequent self checks, etc, should
be included in the program.
Redundant systems need to have separate power sources and
locations (to avoid common mode failures). Use uninter-
rupted power supplies for critical software systems. Have
battery backup for as long as is needed to switch to manual
operation. Avoid a common power supply that can send a
surge to all devices at once or can shut off all devices at
once.
A distributed system can also be used to improve reliability.
The system can sense problems in one processor and will
transfer its work to another processor or system. Hardware
components degrade with time and represent the most impor-
tant factor in ensuring reliability of real-time systems.
Note however that the complexities of a distributed system
can cause new problems and possible reduce reliability. For
example synchronization and precision of numerical values
between programs and communications procedures can cause
errors. More resources are also consumed for coding and
testing and programs become larger (with more chance for
error).
(2) System/Sensors Interfaces:
The computer and sensor interfaces must be thoroughly tested
to prevent mechanical failures, intermittent contacts, connec-
tor problems and noise. Again, provisions for data out of
acceptable ranges must be made.
(3) RF Noise:
Radio Frequency (RF) noise problems can be avoided. Input
and output data should be validated before use. The software
should check for data outside of valid ranges and take appro-
priate action such as an alarm or system shutdown, etc.
Proper maintenance procedures and training in the removing
and replacing of grounding and shielding should be devel-
oped. The interaction of and possible need for separate ana-
log and digital grounds should also be investigated. Thorough
testing of the system in all anticipated environments should of
course be performed.
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(4)ManufacturingandMaintenance:
The duplication, loading and maintenance of software must
be planned for and controlled. Proper procedures must be
developed to assure that the proper code is loaded on each
model of processor. Proper verification of all new compila-
tions of code must also be performed. Buggy compilers can
introduce defects. Subtle changes from one revision of an
operating system to another can cause subtle changes in
response to the same code. Procedures and requirements for
maintenance upgrades must also be made. The updated soft-
ware should be adequately tested and verified (to the same
level, extent and to the same requirements as the operating
software) for accuracy (performance), reliability, and main-
tainability. New software should be modularized and
uploaded as individual modules when maintenance is being
performed. Also, whenever possible, issue firmware changes
as fully populated and tested circuit cards (not as individual
chips).
7. SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT TOOLS
There are a number of methods that can be used to analyze
and verify software.
Fig. 17. SOFTWARE ANALYSIS TOOLS
programming language but with a readable style to better
understand program logic. 17
State transition diagrams (STDs) are also a useful tool. STDs
are graphs that show the possible states of the system as
nodes and the possible changes that may take as lines. This
can highlight poor architecture or unnecessarily complex
computer code.18
Software Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA) analyzes
what can go wrong with the software and what can go wrong
with the system itself. The FMEA should analyze whether or
not the system is fault-tolerant with respect to hardware fail-
ures and to make sure the system specifications are complete.
The actual failure of the computer hardware usually results in
a hard failure and the effects are easily identified. The effects
of failures handled by software may not be so clear. For
example, how does the software handle the loss of one piece
of sensor data or a recovery from a fault?
8. SOFTWARE SAFETY AXIOMS and SUGGESTIONS
These axioms are food for thought. They should be looked
at, read and reread. The principles behind them should be
thoroughly understood.
-Fault tree analysis
-Petri net analysis
-Hazards analysis
-Formal logic analysis
-Software failure modes and effect analysis
Some of these include:
Fault tree analysis can identify critical faults. Potential faults
or problems are identified and then all the conditions that can
lead to those faults are considered and diagrammed.
Petri net analysis provides a way of modeling systems
graphically. A Petri Net has a set of symbols that show
inputs, outputs and states with nodes that are either "places"
(represented by circles) or "transitions" (represented by
vertical lines). When all the places with connections to a
transition are marked, the net is "fired" by removing marks
from each input place and adding a mark to each place
pointed to by the transition (the output places). 15
Hazard analysis can also be performed on the system.
Formal methods for identifying hazards can be used to
evaluate software systems. 16
Formal logic analyzers are logic engines that can verify
specifications. Some source analyzers can reveal logic
problems in code and branching problems.
Pseudo codes are similar to programming languages but are
not compiled. They are used for program design and
verification. They have flow and naming notation of the
Fig. 18. SOFTWARE SAFETY AXIOMS
-Persons who design software should not write the code
and those who write the code should not do the testing.
-Accidents are caused by incomplete or wrong assump-
tions about the system or process being controlled.
Actual coding errors are less frequent perpetrators of
accidents.
-Unhandled controlled system states and environmental
conditions are a big cause of "software malfunctions."
-Lack of up-to-date professional standards in software
engineering and/or lack of use of these standards is a
root cause of many problems.
-Limit the changes to the original system specifications.
-It is impossible to build a complex software system to
behave exactly as it should under all conditions.
Fig. 19. SOFTWARE SAFETY AXIOMS (continued)
-Software safety, quality & reliability are designed in, not
tested in.
-Upstream approaches to software safety are most effec-
tive.
-Software alone is neither safe nor unsafe.
-Many software bugs are timing problems that are diffi-
cult to test for.
.software often fails because the software goes some-
where that the programmer does not think it can get to.
.software systems do not work well until they have been
used.
-Mathematical functions implemented by software are
not continuousfunctions but have an arbitrary number
of discontinuities.
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Fig. 20. SOFTWARE SAFETY AXIOMS (continued)
Engineers believe one can design "black box tests" on
software systems without the knowledge of what is
inside the "box."
Keep safety critical systems as small and as simple as
possible; moving any functions that are not safety
critical to other modules.
Treat a software control system as a single point failure
(often in the past the software was just ignored).
Decide what you do not want to happen - make sure
your program can't get there.
Make sure your system is fault tolerant and that it can
recover from faults and instruction jumps.
Use independent verification and validation of software
(iv&v).
9. CONCLUSION
Software is now used in many safety-critical applications and
each system has the potential to be a single point failure or
zero fault tolerant (i.e., a single failure will cause failure of
the system or if the computer is controlling a hazardous
function, a single failure can cause a hazardous condition to
exist.
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Fig. 21 -- Software Controls on Systems Are Often
Ignored
The potential problems with software are not well
understood. Computers controlling a system (this includes the
computer hardware, the software, the sensors and output
devices that direct the flow of energy) are not a black box
that can be ignored in safety, reliability and risk evaluation.
discontinuities in algorithms, whistles and bells,
more whistles and bells, system overload, HW failure,
sensor failure, rf interference, unstable & undocumented
programs, multiple languages, programmers do not
understand engineering system, sabotage, memoryless
batch programs, HW errors, HW voltage level anomalies,
__ SW & HW
L _ ="_s_yC_!_.v- CONTROL
Fig. 22 -- Software Controls on Systems Are a Single-
Point Failure
However, if handled properly and applied properly, the
use of software and hardware to control a system can be a
valuable design option.
There are many ways to improve the software development
process. Good communication, documentation, standardiza-
tion and configuration management benefit the software
development process. Correct and understandable require-
ments are also a major factor in proper software develop-
ment. Anticipating problems, proper error handling and
improving hardware reliability, help to improve confidence
in the system as well.
There are many ways to validate and improve software qual-
ity (and safety) and this .will be discussed in part II of this
tutorial -- Software Quality And The Design And Inspection
Process.
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